1999), McKelvey's
insight assists in understanding the factors that influence organizational structure and workplacemanagement routines across the organization's life course.
McKevley's (1982) insights dovetail with Phillips' (2002) argument that when founders leave existing organizations (called parents) to found new organizations (called progeny)
, the founder transfers some of the parent's routines to the progeny organization (for other genealogical conceptualizations, see Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976; Freeman, 1986; Klepper, 2001 ). As a consequence, the structure and culture of progeny organizations are in part determined by the structure and culture of their parent organizations. Thus, when examining gender hierarchies, the parent organization's gender hierarchy must be included among the set of initial conditions that influences a new organization's tendency to place women in high-ranking positions over time. In particular, gender hierarchies are often embedded in the workplace-management routines that are transferred from parent organizations to their offspring.
Although I do not locate and identify the transfer of specific workplace-management routines in this study (cf. Winter and Szulanski, 2000) , the literature on women's advancement in law firms has offered many examples of policies and routines that founders may transfer to their new firms. Tables 1 and 2 illustrate some of the policies that can affect women's advancement. They reflect the literature's attention to policies influencing the balance between work and family. Each table lists the routine, its relationship to women's promotion chances, and examples of scholarship that discusses that 
Lowers promotion chances

Part-time employment policies
Part-time work derails women because cri-Harvard Law Review (1996); teria for promotion (e.g., total hours Rhode ( Transfers of routines such as these can lead to paradoxical outcomes, given that these "family-friendly" policies may increase the number of women at the associate level by sending a signal that the firm does not discriminate in hiring (Moss, 2004) . In other words, law firms with a generous maternity leave program may attract women associates but have a poor record of promotion because they punish the same women for taking the leave allowed by the policy. In this case, a founder replicating what are thought to be progressive policies will be replicating the parent's long history of having women associates with few if any women partners. This outcome is one example of institutionalized female subordination, in which a firm's routines result in women's perpetual occupancy of lower-ranked positions. Table 2 provides examples of routines that serve purposes thought to be unrelated to gender but that may have unintended consequences for women's promotion chances. As Marini (1989: 372) observed in her review of the sex segregation literature, job requirements instituted without discriminatory intent can nonetheless affect the level of discrimination. With respect to law firms, a founder may replicate its parent firm's policy of equally distributing work to the firm's associates. The fact that a formalized equal distribution of work tends to reduce discrimination against women (Abbott, 2004) need not be the primary focus of the founder. The status construction research complements Allport's (1954) social contact theory, which together suggest that members of a majority will demonstrate lower levels of discrimination if they have meaningful contact with women of higher status. In the law firm context, some founders leave a parent firm in which women are in leadership positions. Their contact with women leaders should increase the likelihood of promoting women to leadership positions in their new firms. At the same time, a direct implication of Allport's (1954) theory is that interactions with women in subordinate positions, or positions that are thought of as lower status and traditionally gender-appropriate, will result in a lower likelihood that a founder would consider women as legitimate leaders. As a consequence, these founders will be more hesitant to promote a woman to a leadership position in their new firms.
Finally, most founders are much more concerned about setting up an organizational structure that maximizes survival, and much less concerned about how soon they will promote a woman to partner. Phillips (2002) found that, like many other types of startups, young law firms have a high likelihood of failure. To the extent that law firm founders are cognizant of this "liability of newness" (Freeman, Carroll, and Hannan, 1983) , choosing workplace-management routines to maximize survival (e.g., instituting travel requirements for associates to acquire and retain a geographically dispersed client base) will be more salient than choosing routines to maximize women's promotion chances. Nevertheless, the routines they choose may replicate roles for women that have institutionalized female leadership or female subordination in the parent firm.
Institutionalized Female Leadership and Subordination
Key to my theory is the argument that gender hierarchies, whether they tend to place women in leadership or subordinate positions, are often institutionalized in workplace-management routines that transfer across organizational genealogies as parent firms spawn progeny. A parent firm that has had a woman partner for the first nine of its ten years of existence is more likely to spawn progeny that will promote women to partner, even if the progeny's founder worked in the only year in which there was no woman partner. At the same time, progeny firms are less likely to place women in partnership positions when the progeny's founders came from firms in which historically women were only associates. The longer the period in which women in a law firm have only occupied the position of associate, the more likely that women are associated with low-status positions. This gives rise to institutionalized female subordination. For example, a parent firm that has had women associates for 30 years but women partners for only five years has greater institutionalized female subordination than a firm that has had women associates for 10 years but women partners for only five years. In the first firm, many more women were denied partnership, resulting in many years in which women only occupied the lower-ranked, subordinate position. In transferring the routines of their respective parent firms, founders from the first firm would be less likely to promote women than founders from the second firm. Founders from parent organizations that have a long history of women in high-ranked positions are more likely to have high-ranking women in their own organizations. These founders transfer routines that improve the advancement of women.
Hypothesis 1: The more years over its life-cycle that a parent organization had women in leadership positions, the greater the likelihood that its organizational progeny will promote a woman into a leadership position.
Consistent with the logic of hypothesis 1, founders from parent organizations that have a long history of women in subordinate positions are less likely to promote women into leadership positions in their own organizations. That is, founders in these settings transfer workplace-management routines that institutionalize women as subordinates (Zucker, 1977 ; Ridgeway and Erickson, 2000; Lucas, 2003) . Holding the representation of women in leadership positions constant, the longer the period that a founder's parent organization is characterized as having women in subordinate positions, the greater the likelihood that the founder will transfer routines that hinder women's promotion opportunities. As a consequence, these founders will exhibit a lower likelihood of promoting women to leadership positions.
Hypothesis 2: The more years over its life-cycle that a parent organization had women in subordinate positions, the lower the likelihood that its organizational progeny will promote a woman into a leadership position.
In the context of law firms, testing hypothesis 2 requires measuring how many years of the law firm's existence that there have been women associates, controlling for the existence of women partners. A firm that has had women associates for 30 years but women partners for only five years has greater institutionalized female subordination than a firm that has had women associates for 10 years but women partners for only five years. In this way, hypothesis 2 is a powerful test of the conceptual model, with an interesting implication: women have a higher chance of making partner when the founder's parent firm had no women than when women in the parent firm were consistently in subordinate positions.
Social Contact with Female Leaders and Subordinates
A second mechanism for the transfer of gender hierarchies emerges from Allport's (1954) It is also important to note that Allport's (1954) (Nelson, 1988) . Those not promoted to partner must leave the firm (the "Cravath" or "up-or-out" promotion system), although many associates leave the firm well before the partnership decision is made. In my study it is not possible to determine why particular associates leave to start their own law firms; some may leave out of dissatisfaction with the law firm, while others are fired. In either case, Smigel (1969) noted the traditional practice of law firms working for an amicable separation between the firm and the associate. In some cases, a former associate leaves to start a firm that obtains business from its parent firm's referrals.
Lower-ranked members who leave to found their own firms are more prone to re-create the routines associated with the structure and organization of work for two reasons. First, former lower-ranked members, especially former associates in law firms, are only exposed to the narrow range of firm-specific routines associated with being a lower-ranked employee and typically do not have the opportunity to formally consider alternatives to the routines they enact. Because, as Smigel (1969) , Wholey (1985) , and others have noted, law firm labor markets are overwhelmingly within-firm, there is little mobility between firms, and associates who leave to found firms tend to have only worked in one law firm. Also, former associates are not often given the opportunity to learn managerial or leadership routines and have little understanding of what partners do (Phillips, 2001; Kercher, 2002; Sapp, 2002 routines. Associates, however, have a much less sophisticated understanding of alternatives to their firm's routines. Second, because former associates have lower status than former partners, they obtain greater legitimacy from being similar to their more-established parent firm. In their study of high-tech startups, Schoonhoven, Eisenhardt, and Lyman (1990) argued that the pressures of mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) would compel young firms to respond to uncertainty by copying the actions of their peers. Similarly, former associates are likely to replicate their parent firm's routines to achieve external legitimacy more often than former partners because the need to signal legitimacy is greater for former associates (Singh, Tucker, and House, 1986) .
It is also important to reiterate that when routines are transferred from the parent to the progeny law firm, the founder may be unaware of how the routines affect the advancement of women in the new firm. As was discussed with the examples of routines in table 2, the top priority of a founder is the survival of the new firm. Much of this difference is likely due to the greater ability of partners to leave with clients, network relationships, and other forms of social capital that enhance their new firm's competitive strength and legitimacy in the market for legal services. Firms with former partners are advantaged, especially in the first few years of the law firm's founding (Phillips, 2002) . This should have two consequences. First, because they are less likely to have the clientele and legitimacy of former partners, I expect that former associates are more likely to replicate routines from the parent to minimize the liability of newness they face (Singh, Tucker, and House, 1986). Second, the greater need that former associates have to generate revenue quickly increases the probability that they will replicate their parent firm's routines, as those are the routines that are the most available, with less concern about their effects on the advancement of women.
In contrast to associates, the primary reason why law firm partners depart is because they disagree with the firm's current norms, strategy, and routines (Abel, 1989; Hillman, 1990) . Partners leave parent firms as "deviants" with the goal of founding a new firm that is different from the parent firm. For example, the Recorder, a prominent northern California legal newspaper, noted that a law firm called the Venture Law Group was founded in part because a key partner in Wilson Sonsini (the market leader in Silicon Valley), Craig Johnson, wanted to deviate from Wilson Sonsini's routines, such as its organization of work, the structure of its partnership track, and profit-sharing rules (Walsh, 1994; Osbourne, 1996) . Overall, the tendency for former partners to deviate and for former associates to imitate their parent firms supports the contention that firms founded by associates will be more likely to transfer workplace-management routines wholesale from the parent firm.1 Hypothesis 5a: The hypothesized effect in H1 of institutionalized female leadership should be greater when the founder was formerly a lower-ranked member of the parent firm.
Hypothesis 5b: The hypothesized effect in H2 of institutionalized female subordination should be greater when the founder was formerly a lower-ranked member of the parent firm.
Unlike the prediction for institutionalized female leadership and subordination, neither the background literature nor insights on the context provide a clear hypothesis for whether Allport's (1954) social contact prediction (articulated as H3 and H4) would vary by the former rank of the founder. To develop a more robust interpretation of the overall findings, however, it is helpful to empirically document whether Allport's social contact hypothesis varies by the former rank of the founder, which I do after testing H5a and H5b.
The Transfer of Routines I have argued that gender inequality persists when transferred routines reproduce the parent's structure and organization of work. The imagery is one of founders taking a bundle of routines with them upon the founding of the progeny. If these arguments are correct, the effect of the parent's gender hierarchy should be stronger for those progeny that also reproduce other aspects of the parent's organization of work. That is, progeny that are organized in a way similar to their parent firms should be more likely to replicate the parent's gender hierarchy. Progeny organized in a way that is distinct from their parent firms would have fewer routines in common. These more dissimilar progeny should be less likely to be influenced by their parent firm's gender hierarchy.
Hypothesis 6a: The less similar a progeny's organization of work is to its parent firm, the weaker the hypothesized effect in H1 of institutionalized female leadership. Hypothesis 6b: The less similar a progeny's organization of work is to its parent firm, the weaker the hypothesized effect in H2 of institutionalized female subordination.
Comparing Progeny with de Novo Firms
The final test of the model developed here is to verify that progeny law firms, because of the intergenerational transfer of routines, have different promotion rates for women than de novo firms (those that do not have parent firms). If the lineage that creates the organizational genealogy is meaningful, the transfer of routines for progeny should distinguish them from de novo firms. Progeny with institutionalized female leadership should promote women at a greater rate than de novo firms. Progeny with institutionalized female subordination should promote women at a lower rate than de novo firms. For each law firm, I coded its founding date (its first appearance in the directory) to alleviate any left-censoring. In all, I collected data on 513 law partnerships across the fifty years, which includes every firm listed with more than one active attorney-solo practitioners were excluded because they cannot be parent firms and lack distinctive hierarchical positions. I tested my hypotheses on a subset of these data, using the last thirty-three years .2 The observation period reflects the fact that before 1963 there were no women associates in any of the firms in my sample. Accordingly, I consider my risk set as including any firm founded after 1962. The resulting dataset contains 421 firms, 134 of which are progeny.
Dependent Variable
Having a woman in a partner position. I coded a dummy variable to capture whether or not a firm had a woman partner and followed each firm annually until one of the firm's partners was a woman. The variable equals one for the firm-year in which there is a woman partner. When this occurs, the firm exits the risk set. I determined the sex of the attorney by using first names. Although there were no partners with gender-neutral names, there were associates whose sex was unclear. When possible, I confirmed sex with photographs available on the Web or in local bar association directories. I classified any gender-neutral name (e.g., Pat) as male unless a photograph proved otherwise. Mirroring the occurrence of women partners in other samples of law firms, 18 of the 134 (13.4 percent) firms listed a woman as partner by 1996.3 Given that in my data the partnering of the first woman in a law firm was of only one woman at a time, and that 54.6 percent of the parent firms that had women associates never promoted a woman to partner, modeling the risk of a firm partnering a woman for the first time is appropriate.
Independent Variables
Institutionalization of gender hierarchies from parent firms. I considered female leadership to be institutionalized the greater the proportion of years that a progeny firm's parent had any women partners before the founder left to found the progeny firm. I coded this by calculating the proportion of years that there was a woman partner in the parent firm, beginning with the parent firm's first year and ending with the year that the founder departed. The variable ranged from zero (the parent firm never had any women partners before the founder left) to one (the parent firm had at least one woman partner in each year from its birth until the founder left). Similarly, I coded the proportion of years that a parent firm had women associates as an indicator of how institutionalized women in subordinate positions were.
Social contact. To capture a founder's past contact with women at the partner and associate levels, I coded two variables. The first indicates the number of years the founder worked when there were also women partners in the parent firm. The second indicates the number of years the founder worked when there were also women associates in the parent firm. My modification of Allport's (1954) thesis suggests that the greater the number of years of social contact with women partners, the more likely that the founder will promote a woman to partner. Conversely, previous contact with women associates should make founders less likely to promote a woman to partner.
Figures la and 1b give examples of the difference between the institutionalization hypothesis and the social contact hypothesis. In each figure, a parent firm has a woman promoted to a high-ranked (leadership) position in year five. Also, each example features an employee who enters the firm in the 15th year and leaves in the 20th year to found a new firm. The difference between figures la and lb lies in the number of years that the high-ranked woman remains in the organization. In figure la, the high-ranked woman remains in the parent firm at least 15 years. When the employee leaves to found a new firm, the high-ranked woman is still a member of the parent firm. In this case, the degree to which female leadership is institutionalized is 0.75, because a woman was high ranked in 15 of the 20 years that the parent firm was in existence. Measuring the social contact hypothesis, the new employee had five years of interaction with the woman leader. In figure 1b, the woman leader leaves after five years-well before the new employee enters the firm. While the years of direct interaction is 0, the value of institutionalized female leadership is greater than zero, or 0.25 Founder's former rank. To test hypotheses 5a and 5b, I constructed a variable that equals one if the founder was a former associate and zero if the founder was a former partner. If the intergenerational persistence of gender inequality is greater for founders who were formerly lower-ranked members of the parent firm (associates), interacting this term with each of the institutionalization variables would yield an amplified effect. That is, former associates should be affected by institutionalized female leadership and subordination more than former partners (hypotheses 5a and 5b). If these interaction effects are not statistically significant, then former associates (lower-ranked members) are no less likely to be influenced by the parent firm's gender hierarchy than former partners (higher-ranked members).
4
The example in figure 1b captures 26 percent of my sample in which the founders had no previous direct contact with women partners but worked in a parent firm that had women partners before the founder worked there.
Similarity of organization of work. To test hypotheses 6a and 6b, I coded the associate-to-partner ratio of each law firm. Traditionally, this ratio, called the leverage ratio, is the central organizing principle in law firms (Galanter and Palay, 1991; Kordana, 1995; Sherer, 1995). Sherer (1995) found that the In about 10 percent of the cases, the progeny had multiple parents. For these cases, I averaged the leverage ratios of each parent and used this to code the similarity of work. To insure that progeny with multiple parents did not affect my results, I reran the analyses with a dummy variable for whether a firm had multiple parents. The dummy variable was insignificant, and none of the hypothesized results were affected. leverage ratio is highly correlated with a firm's business strategy (e.g., specialist vs. generalist), human resource management (e.g., organized by formal departments), and whether the firm was a branch office. To the extent that gender hierarchy is transferred as a routine, those progeny that are different from their parent firms with respect to the leverage ratio should be less likely to replicate the parent's gender hierarchy. (1) the total number of full-time partners and (2) the total number of full-time associates. Given that the distribution of firm sizes was log-normal (skewed to reflect a few relatively large firms), I coded the log of each size variable. This specification yields estimates that are easier to interpret than including the leverage ratio and does not change my results.
I coded
To minimize concerns about unobserved heterogeneity due to characteristics of the parent firm, I also included the parent firm's size and age. Larger and younger parent firms may have been more likely to have women at the associate and partner levels, confounding the results.
In addition to measuring size, I coded a dummy variable for whether a firm was a branch office, given that branch offices may be organized differently (Sherer, 1995) Because women may be disproportionately underrepresented in a particular area of law, I coded dummy variables for different areas of law practice. To preserve statistical power, I included only those practices that improved the fit of the model: estate/probate, tax, insurance, tort, labor/employment, real estate, and intellectual property. Practice area dummy variables capture the possibility that a firm is in a market position (or niche) that drives particular patterns of gender inequality.
To capture whether there were some firms that were more innovative than the typical Silicon Valley law firm, and thus more likely to take more novel approaches to the organization of work and promotion of women to the position of partner, I coded a dummy variable one if the law firm was the first in Silicon Valley to move into a new area of law, and zero otherwise. These "local innovators" may be less constrained by the set of norms traditionally observed in practice. Moreover, their innovativeness suggests that they are making a substantial investment for future growth and may be seeking new and different individuals to staff a new area of practice.
Method of Estimation
I estimated the likelihood of admitting a woman to a firm's partnership with piecewise constant exponential models. In these models, I split the time axis into time periods according to firm age. The models give an age-dependent constant (a "y-intercept") for each time piece of the model. The null model is an exponential model without time periods, in which it is assumed that rates are time-invariant. The y-intercepts included in the model were statistically significant with respect to a chi-squared model improvement test. Table 3 presents the summary statistics for each of the variables. Table 4 provides pairwise correlations. The key independent variables, the proportion of years the parent has women partners (institutionalized female leadership) and the proportion of years the parent has women associates (institutionalized female subordination), are correlated at .45, but not to the extent that mutlicollinearity is a concern. Only two pairs of variables are correlated at over .50. Partner growth is highly correlated with associate growth at .62, and the correlation between the proportion of years that a parent firm had women associates (institutionalized female subordination) and the number of years a founder formerly worked with women associates (social contact with female subordinates) is correlated at .70. All other correlations are less than .50.
RESULTS
Institutionalized Female Leadership and Subordination
In tables 5a and 5b are the models that test hypotheses 1-6 and the alternative explanations. To save space, the dummy variables for the areas of practice are not presented. Model 1 presents the firm-age time pieces and control variables. Perhaps the most interesting finding is that attorneys who initially went to work in law firms that already had women partners are more likely to promote a woman to partner when they leave to found their own firms (p < .05). This suggests that some attorneys chose to work in firms with women partners, then promoted a woman to their partnership when they founded their own firms. Model 2 introduces the two female institutionalization variables. Hypothesis 1 is supported (p < .01). Founders are more likely to make a woman a partner when their parent firms had a history of women partners. This effect remains positive and significant across the remainder of the models and is independent of the new firm's size, market position (practice areas), new market expansion, location, growth rate, attrition, the proportion of women associates, the founder's previous position, the presence of women when the founder first worked in the parent firm, founding team demographics, and the size and age of the parent firm. Separate analyses verified that this result holds if the two institutionalization variables are entered separately. Hypothesis 2 is also supported (p < .01) and holds across all models and controls. Founders are less likely to make women partners in their new firms when their parent firms had a long history of women subordinates. Together, models 2 and 4 suggest that the likelihood of a woman being made partner is lowest when the parent firm had a long history of women associates without ever having a woman partner.6
Social Contact with Female Leaders and Subordinates
Although the variable for the number of years a founder worked with women partners is in the expected direction, hypothesis 3 is not supported. Founders who worked beside women partners are no more likely to promote women than founders who did not work beside women partners. Hypothesis 4 is supported in model 3 but loses significance in model 4, when the institutionalization variables are included. Partial support for hypothesis 4 suggests that direct contact with women subordinates may lead founders to discount women's ability to lead when they found new firms, but this effect is confounded by institutionalized female subordination (r = .70).
Because my models include both men and women founders, they cannot clearly test Allport's (1954) theory about whether a majority's (men's) interaction with a minority (women)
would result in the majority having a higher or lower evaluation of the minority. To test whether the social contact hypotheses were supported for founding teams with only men, a sample that better matches Allport's theory, I reran the analysis excluding firms that had any women on their founding teams, reducing the sample size to 100 firms. Hypotheses 3 and 4 were supported in these models (as were hypotheses 1 and 2), but the models were less likely to converge because there are fewer cases and thus much less variance to explain in the all-male models, giving reason to be cautious about the results. The only other difference between the results in the all-male sample and the main sample used in these analyses is that the control variables for the mean and variance in founder age were negative and significant. This suggests that older male founders and founders with little difference in their ages were less likely to promote women to partner. In sum, to the extent that there is support for Allport's social contact theory, my analyses suggest that the effect may exist for male founders only.
Institutionalization Hypotheses and Founder's Former Rank
Model 5 in table 5b tests whether the institutionalized female leadership and subordination effects vary by the previous rank of the founder. In particular, the models examine whether the two institutionalized variables have their strongest effect when carried from the parent firm by a former associate, compared with a former partner (the reference category). The results suggest that former associates are more likely to be influenced by the parent's gender hierarchy than former partners, supporting hypotheses 5a and 5b (p < .01, p < .05). Founders who were former associates are more likely to make a woman a partner when the parent firm had a history of female leadership. The effect is substantial: arbitrarily setting the level of institutionalized female leadership equal to 0.5, the effect for a former associate is 2.84 times stronger than for a former partner. Similarly, if the level of institutionalized female subordination is set equal to 0.5, the effect for a former associate is 3.31 times stronger than for a former partner. The evidence for H5a and H5b together strongly suggests that former associates are more likely to be influenced by the parent's institutionalized female leadership and subordination than former partners.
Model 6 tests whether the effects of social contact with women partners and associates vary by the former rank of the founder, a result that was not formally hypothesized. There is no statistically significant evidence that former associates are more influenced by social contact with women leaders than are former partners. There is weak evidence that former associates are more influenced by social contact with women subordinates than are former partners (p < .10). Additional analyses using the 100 firms with only male founders also lacked statistically significant results. Overall, there is little evidence that Allport's theory is stronger for former associates than it is for former partners.
The Transfer of Routines
Model 7 examines the relationship between the proposed institutionalized effects and the similarity between the parent and progeny law firms. Hypotheses 6a and 6b proposed that progeny who are very different from the parent firm with respect to the routines for the organization of work (captured by the difference in the leverage ratio) are less likely to replicate the parent firm's gender hierarchy. In support of hypothesis 6a, the coefficient for the interaction between the difference in leverage ratios and institutionalized female leadership is negative and statistically significant. Routines associated with institutionalized female leadership are less likely to be transferred when the progeny has enacted workplace-management routines that are different from its parent's set of routines. This suggests that the routines that also replicate the parent firm's structure and organization of work are transferred with the routines that promote female leadership. Testing hypothesis 6b, the coefficient for the difference in leverage ratios and the institutionalized female subordination variable is positive as expected, but the effect is not statistically significant, failing to support hypothesis 6b. Even so, the overall results in model 7 lend credence to the argument that gender hierarchies are embedded in the routines that founders take to their new firms, especially those routines associated with institutionalized female leadership.
Comparing Progeny with de Novo Firms
The four models in table 6 test whether founders of progeny law firms with exposure to institutionalized female leadership and subordination differed from de novo law firms (the refer- I also ran each of the analyses in tables 5a, 5b, and 6 with different weights for the institutionalization and social contact variables. For example, I multiplied the original institutionalization variables by the proportion of women at that particular level. These weighted variables were slightly less significant (but still statistically significant) and did not otherwise alter the results.
For each of the models in this paper, model fit is determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), which is applied to survival models (Schwarz, 1978 Another finding of this paper is that former associates are more influenced than former partners by the history of female leadership and subordination in the parent firm. Whereas associates are rarely exposed to a wide range of routines and receive greater legitimacy from constituents (e.g., clients) by replicating the structure and routines of the parent firm, former partners often leave with the explicit goal of deviating from the parent firm's routines.
Also supporting the institutionalization hypotheses, I found that progeny firms that had a different organization of work were less likely to be influenced by the routines of the parent firm surrounding female leadership. To the extent that a progeny law firm operated with a different leverage ratio than its parent firm, it was less likely to replicate the routines of the parent firm and thus less likely to have transferred the routines that reproduce gender inequality. Second, not only must organization-specific routines be central, there should be relatively little cost in transferring them (Nelson and Winter, 1982) . To the extent that a parent firm's core technology is driven by human assets rather than physical assets, a potential founder can more easily leave with routines and implement them in the new firm without effective resistance from the parent firm. In law firms, like most professional service organizations, human assets drive production; they are the core technology of the organization. When attorneys leave, they take their own human (and social) capital with them. While there is often a cost to the parent firm (Phillips, 2002) , there are few meaningful barriers that a parent law firm can erect to prevent the movement of routines.
Third, my emphasis on the distinction between leadership and subordination acknowledges that there needs to be a substantial status distance between the lower-ranked position and the higher-ranked position. One reason why "institutionalized subordination" exists in law firms is because asso-ciates are fundamentally lower in status and subordinate to the partners (Smigel, 1969) . Thus attempts to replicate my findings should insure that an organization's subordinate or lower-ranked positions are clearly lower-status when compared with the higher-ranked positions under examination.
Finally, the transfer of gender hierarchies is stronger in law firm partnerships, contexts in which women have been traditionally denied promotion opportunities (Nelson, 1988; Ziewacz, 1996) . Indeed, being a woman partner is seen by some as a deviant role identity (Yoder, 1991) . Women associates occupy a more gender-appropriate role than do women partners (Epstein, 1970; Yoder, 1991) . In fact, few institutions have greater gender inequality than law firms, especially at the level of partnership (see Chaves' 1996 work on women clergy for an exception). Thus support for my arguments should be weaker in settings in which female leadership is more often seen as gender-appropriate.
As In addition to exploring other types and sizes of organizations, future work should empirically document the transfer of routines from the parent to the progeny. Specifically, we need a more precise understanding of what is transferred from the parent to its offspring. While the examples of workplace-management routines given in tables 1 and 2, and the finding that female institutionalized leadership is stronger when the founder also replicated the parent firm's organization of work (in model 7 of table 5b), shed light on this question, we need to be able to clearly distinguish the transfer of routines as policies (e.g., recruitment and promotion policies) from, let's say, the culture the founder instills (Schein, 1992) . Future scholarship should seek to understand whether the transfer needs be purposive and whether its implications for gender hierarchies are intentional.
CONCLUSION
This research provides evidence that opportunity structures are reproduced across organizational generations. In the liter-ature on law firms, there is continuing attention to the persistence of gender inequality Hull and Nelson, 2000) , but its structural antecedents in this and other contexts have been too often neglected. Directing our attention to the intergenerational transfer of institutionalized structures, routines, and values that reproduce gender inequalities is an important early step in eliminating them. Our understanding of the diversity of opportunity structures utilized by employers is incomplete without considering the opportunity structures of the previous organizational generation and the characteristics of organizations that spawn offspring. As founders leave their parent organizations, the organizational models they carry with them reproduce the set of employment opportunities and constraints faced by employees in the parent firm. In other words, the intergenerational diffusion of employment practices may contribute to the persistence of employment models over time, directly or indirectly affecting the opportunities for a new generation of employees.
Overall, this paper suggests new avenues for inquiry for scholars in a number of research traditions. First, for entrepreneurship scholars, future research should consider not only routines and innovations that are purposively transferred by founders, but also those routines that are unintentionally transferred. Documenting that offspring resemble their parents in unintended ways not only presents a new avenue in organizational research, it also opens up the more compelling question of what the consequences are of the unintended transfer of routines, structures, and roles for new organizations. Indeed, the need to explore the unintended transfer of routines, structures, and roles emphasized here applies to any study of interorganizational mobility, especially when the organization of work is central to the theoretical question.
Second, this research presents a call to better understand how the set of routines transferred are shaped by the founder's former position in the parent firm. In this paper, I found that higher-status senior members transfer routines differently than junior members. In some other organizational contexts, I would expect that organizational members from the core of the parent firm transfer different routines than members from the parent firm's periphery. Similarly, scholars studying technology-oriented organizational contexts should find that employees in positions that involve new innovations should transfer routines that are different than employees in positions that are more associated with management skills. In general, the variety of routines transferred should be a function of the variety of organizational positions from which former employees come.
Finally, the promise of a genealogical approach to organizations lies not only in uncovering the replication of structures and routines but in understanding in the consequences of the replication of routines for critical issues such as gender inequality. To the extent that gender inequality is embedded in organizational structures and routines, there is a risk that it will be replicated when employees leave to start new firms. Indeed, even founders who seek to improve the lack of success women faced in their previous employer may uninten-tionally replicate the inequality in their new firms by transferring routines that have unintended or unexpected consequences. At the same time, founders from firms that have institutionalized female leadership may replicate the success of women in their new firms whether or not it is their objective to do so. Ultimately, this research points to the importance of directly examining the structural antecedents of gender inequality and to the value of a genealogical perspective on organizations.
